COMMENTS ON RECENT DECISIONS.
'THE LAW OF ASSIGNMENT FOR THE BENEFIT OF CREDITORS IN THE
STATE OF ILLINOIS; Being an Analysis of an Act Concerning

Voluntary Assignments, iApproved May 22, 1877, in Force July I,
1877, and Amended by Acts in Force July i, 1879, and July. Y,1883,
and a Collation of all the Decisions of the Supreme and Appellate
Courts of Illinois in which the Act has been Construed. By SYDNEY
RICHMOND TABER, of the Chicago Bar. Chicago: E. N. Myers
& Co., Law Publishers, 1893.
This is a very creditable little volume of some one hundred pages, in
-which the author attempts to answer the inquiries: "What does the
Illinois Assignment Act mean? how have its several parts been construed
'by the Courts? what are the rights and duties of insolvent debtors, of
assignees, of creditors, and of the courts whose jurisdiction is invoked in
this behalf? In a word, touching the subject of voluntary assignments,
what is the law of Illinois?" In carrying out his purpose, Mr. TABER
,first gives the Assignment Act of Illinois of May 22, r877, as amended by
the Act of July 1, 1877, and the Act of July r, z883, in full. He then
treats of the assignment proper, first giving an analysis of the statute and
then a synopsis of the principal decisions of the Court. At the end of
-this chapter, on pages 40 to 45 inclusive, we find a very good table of
leading cases. The second chapter deals with the assignor, the third with
the assignee, the fourth and last with the Court. Of course; the book is
.onl useful to Illinois. lawyers. To these it will prove a very handy little
volume on a subject of importance to the practitioner.
W. D. L.
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SUNDAY LAWS.
I beg to suggest that Mr. RINGGOLD, in his article in the November
'92 number of the AMERICAN LAW REGISTER AND REVIEW, has over-

looked a matter of history of great importance in the argument. Prior to
the Revolution, not only Christianity, but Protestant Christianity, was estabJished by law in this province. The Test Act was enforced in Pennsylvania. Has there been any abolition of this religion? Absolute toleration
and a nominal equality exist, and as respects Christian sects, so far as a pro"hibitionof exclusive privileges goes, there is a real iquality before the law.
The gist of his argument is that the Sunday laws are passed-in the
interest of or as supporting the views of Christians, and this he contends
-is unconstitutional. Where does such reasoning lead to? Stated ab-stractly it is: "No legislation is lawful that has as its real motive the
e6nforcing of any conduct because of a real or supposed obligation of
Christianity."
The Sunday laws are doubtless the offspring of a very small part of
Christendom. Puritanism is the parent, and nothing shows the power of
-the members of this little narrow-minded sect than the way they have
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affected Catholic Ireland, contrary to the -usages 'and- traditions of their'
church. I, at least; have been -truck writh the fact that Catholic and
Protestant fiom that. island do not differ in. their notions of the mode of'
.
observing Sunday.
But if laws are unconstitutional because they are meaningless except.
as being' the enforcement of a Christian duty or a duty of a Christian
commonwealth, then all legislation, laws, customs and national habits,
aid Usages that have grown out of our religion are alike brought under.the bani.
To begin with, our oaths of office and'in courts of justiceon what.
are they founded? Our law against polygamy,. and our common law on.
the subjcts of concubinage and Pastardy; our law of marriage, even with.
the caricature of our law of divorce, what are they all founded on?
Starting with a tabu a ra a as to religion and the morality of Christianity, where will be found our elements of morality that are the basig.ot.
- law to a large extent? It isquite generaly supposed that the poor laws,
and the provision for the insane, the sick itnd the injured, arethe outcome
of Christian teaching, and a sense of obligation that has -thus come even.
, to those among us vho reject the abstract dogma of any-revelation.
There is a sentence of a -man of some mark among us, Mr. Justide
DuNcAN-Christianity is part of the common law of Pennsylvania-and.
it was repeated with approval by SHARSWOOD, J, which might be translated thus: At common law Christianity was the religion of this Province,
- and while the power to exact adherence to its dogmas, as matter of belief
is taken from the legislature, there has as yet been no legislative abolitionof or change in the common law in respect of*religion. "Therefore,"
said he, "we have retained the laws agains blasphemy."
I therefore suggest that it might be as well to consider the foundations 'before we undertake to remove as unconstitutional the most markedK national' characteristic that we brought with us as colonists. Can any
one doubt that the founders of our system would ha've been the most-sur- prised of any people to learn that the religious liberty they proclaimed
. meant- that it was to be illegal to be guided in legislation by the religious.
opinions of the pebple, and above all by their notions of morality derived
-from the religion of their forefathers?

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
By constitition, the restriction of the supreme power of the State'in the only'mode in which a State can speak, as we have just beeninformed by the Chief Justice in 146 U. S., 25, McPherson v. Blacker,.
- and this without dissent or qualification, is a political novelty of this.
century. The entrusting of a small body called the judiciary with
the authority to disregard this expression of the sovereign will is an.
amazing novelty, but it is a logical necessity of an organizing constitution; it seems to be a category of the human mind;. one cannot
think outside of the limit or "donceive of any other rule with our
notions of the meaning of law. But it has always been supposed to-.
arise- out of this mode of organizing a government. When applied, as-
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originally it was, this authority involved nor more and nothing else than a
question of power. For years no one ever suggested any other condition.
Power to be ascertained from two docunients, the one only restraining,
the other only granting. "It must be remembered, however," says
TILGHIAN, C. J., in Comm. v. Smith, 4 Binney, at page r23, "that for
weighty reasons it has been assumed as a'principle in construing constitutions by the - Supreme Court of the United States, by this Court, and
by every other Court of reputation in the United States, that an Act of
the legislature is not to be declared void unless the violation of the Constitutionz is so manifest as to leave no room for reasonable doubt." A
power from without, or a restraint on legislation from without the writtem
constitutions, was not dreamed of. Within these limits the reasons pro and
con as to any measure are debatable before the judiciary, that body has
nothing to do with the wisdom or folly of the legislature. They may
bear on construction, but on nothing else. And why? If the folly, or
injustice, or cruelty of a law is a ground for refusing obedience, it is'plain
the judiciary are by the Constitution made a part of the legislature, and,
to perform a function in its very nature legislative.
The judiciary, under the modem claim of right, must, then, limit the
law-making power confessedly not by a restraint foundin the Constitution,.
but by considerations of the propriety of xercising a power that is conferred or not restrained. For the existence of the power, unless restrained,
is'the postulate in every possible case arising upon an act of a State.
In the case of the States it is never a question whether there is a.
grant of power, but is there a restraint. A restraint on a sovereignty
derived by an inference from notions of right and wrong is essentiallynot judicial but legislative, and where are these notions to be ascertained,.
hidden as'they may be in the mind of the unborn judge? If to these we
add notions of political economy, will not all admit these are for the legislature to determine?
Let one attempt to frame a clause of a constitution in the line ofthis
modem notion of constitutional law, e.g., "The legislature shall have no.
power to enact any statute which isfoolish, unjust orcruel," and can anything more chaotic be conceived than all future legislation? Still more
preposterous, if we attempt to embody the high-sounding but meaningless.
phrases of the Declaration of Independence. Do but consider that an unconstitutional law is a nullity-it never was a law. It is as if it never had
been. It leaves all men acting under it without justification or excuse.
Cf., the illustration by TILGHMAN, C.J., 4 Bin., 123, a thousand judgments.
become void, as a judge may years afterward deem a law impolitic. A
sheriff may be converted into a murderer.
Is there a rule of law, the wisest and the best, that does not at times.
work the grossest injustice, and. can a statute be framed that does not
sometimes do this? Is the law to operate when it is just, and not otherwise? And what is just but legality? No lawyer from the time of the
twelve tables has ever conceived of any other meaning of the word in the
administration of law. What is meant by justa causa fiossidendi? Does
it mean a righteous or honest cause?
Bad as it is, and always will be, to be at the mercy of a legislative.

.
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body, will there be any improvement by coqimitting part of their trust.to
another body of the same kind of persons, and qualify.them by writing
"Judge" after their nam e, instead of-" Senator." Dofs-this change the
reasoning faculty, or even enlighten it ? Will there be anything conspicuous after the 'change, except universal uncertainty-a removal of the
ply element of certainty that exists-the meaning of the written word of
the law,'by-substituting ought to 3e for is in the authoritative declaration
of the rule by the State?

It cannot be supposed that there is anything in this paper that has
not -been familiar as their alphabet t6 all who have ever reached the posi.
Von to pronounce on the validity of.a law and compare it with a constitution, and'as the result is plain that no effect is produced by thege ideas,
A6r.even a doubt raised, one cannot but feel how curiously constituted is
that faculty called the reason. But one cannot cease to wonder at th
very small space it occupies, in the government of mankind, less even thant
Bishop BUTLER assigns to conscience.
After reading MARSHALL'S solution of the problem, it. seems absolutely self-evident, but.it is because of the basis or postulate of the argument. To one class of minds this is everything; to another it is evidently
-.without meaning. The one recognizes the State restraining its officers 15y
a document to be construed ai understood. Theptlierfinds the restraint
*in the views that may be entertained as to the incojisistency of the law
with an unwritten and undefined code of ethics, political economy or
policy, And we have this marvelous product, that fublic policy, as the standard of law, is not to be found in the declared will of the State, but
in the private opinion of the persons empowered to declare the law.
And thus we have a people which will not permit a man to dispose of
per*hisproperty by oral statements, even when undisputed, but who *ill
mit the State to be shorn of its sovereignty by the notions of five out of
nine- unborn persons, to be selected from time to time by the President:
Truly our ancestors must
- and educated men believe this was intended.
have had a sublime confidence in the accuracy of the workings of the'
minds of the embryo judiciary in all matters of State, of morals and of
politics.
A well-known story will bear repetition as illustrative of the divers
, oiders of minds. Judge STORY found in modern philanthropy the basis
of an antecedent eternal law, and deduced as the result: The glave trade
* is contrary to the law of nations, its guaranty by the Constitution for a
limited period notwithstanding. Lord STOWELL said: How can I pronounce a practice to be contrary to the law of nations that has sedulously'
been protected by Acts of Parliament and treaties of my own country?
To the one class laws and written constitutions are mere cobwebs to the
will, which is mistaken for the reason; to the other, fetters and chains
which bind them.. So long as we persist in shutting our minds to the conception of there being still the same Common Law Constitution which we
improved, modified and made compulsory in some particulars, but otherwise liable to modification by the legislature, so longprobably.shall we
find instances of mistakes of the kind that it has been the purpose of this
paper to point out.

